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On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition~
Slilc~o Muro
rrrr „Iry .,jEr nnurnic'.e, rnr,uku Uniurr.cily, Kmruued~i, Auhu-kn, S'rndaei 9A0, Jupan .
Received September II, 19R9
Three licensing policies, lhe auclion, the fee, and the royalty, are studied in a
Bertrand-lype duopoly with differentiated goods. The analysis is conducted in
terms of a multistage noncooperative game involving an external patentee and two
firms each producing a difTerenliated good in l3ertrand ( price) competition. A
principal finding is that fnr a patenlee the royalty may be superior to thc other
two policics. Juurnul ujL:rnnurnic' Lilcran,re Classification Numbers: 026. 611,
62L a'~ Iv9? ncadcmic Prrss. Inc.
l. INTRODUCTION
In licensing a patented cost-reducing process innovation, a patentee
may use several different policies. Policies often observed are (I) the
auction: auctioning off a limited number of licenses lhrough a sealed bid
auction; (2) the fee: offering a lump-sum licensing fee; and (3) the royalty:
offering a royalty payment per unit of production. In the latter two policies,
any firm that wishes can purchase a license. Implications of these policies
were examined in Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), Kamien, Oren, and
Tauman (1987), and Katz and Shapiro (1986). These studies were, how-
ever, limited to the case where goods produced by firms are homogeneous;
and thus, Cournot competilion in a product market was mainly supposed.
Among the results, in particular, it was shown that the royalty is never
optimal for a patentee. Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Kamien, Oren,
and Tauman (1987) included an analysis in Bertrand competition, but
' This research was supported in part by the Education Ministry of Japan and by the
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because of the homogeneity of goods, the result was quite simple: the
three policies are equivalent and all are optimal for a patentee.
The purpose of this paper is to study [he patentee's optimal policy
in Bertrand competition where firms' products are substitutes but not
homogeneous. A principal finding is that for a patentee the royalty may
be superior lo the other two policies when innovations are not very large.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
a differenliated duopoly model is described which we assume throughout
this paper. In Section 3, Bertrand-Nash equilibria in lhe product markel
are presented. In Section 4, subgame perfect equilibria are studied in three
types of games generated from the three licensing policies. ln Section S,
the patentee's optimal policy is examined. The paper closes in Section 6
with brief remarks on further studies conceniing licensing in a differenti-
ated duopoly. ~
2. THE MODEL
Following Singh and Vives (1984), we consider the following duopoly
model. There are two firms (firm 1 and firm 2) each producing a differenti-
ated good. Denote by x; ? 0 firm i's output level, and by p; ? 0 its unit
price where i- 1, 2. Consumers are identical, and the representative
consumer maximizes U(x~, zz) - p~.r~ - pzxz, where U is his utility
function which is quadratic, strictly concave in x~ and xz, and symmetric
with respect to x~ and xz:
U(-ri,xz) - a(x~ f xz) - b((xi)z f- 2t3x~xz -t- (xz)z)l2.
Here a and li are positive, and - l G B c I. Firms' products are substitutes,
independent, or complements according to whether B J 0, -0, or c0.
Direct demands are then given by
x. - max (1
- 6)a - p; f 6p~ Ol
' - b( I - Bz) ' I
for i - I, 2, i ~ j. (2. I)
We further suppose, for simplicity, that firms' cost functions are linear
and identical: the function is given by cx, where c, c c a, is a constant
marginal cost and z is an output level. The following analysis focuses on
the case where firms engage in Bertrand (price) competition and their
products are close substitutes; i.e., t7 is close to 1. Other cases are briefly
discussed in Section 6.
In addition to firms, there is an external patentee with a patented process
innovation. For simplicity, we assume that the innovation lowers both
firms' marginal costs by the same amount e, where 0 c e c c. The
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patentee's aim is to license lhe patent to both or one of the firms so as to
maximize his total rents. In what follows, we examine which of the follow-
ing three observable licensing policies is optimal for the patentee.
(1) The auction policy: one license is auctioned ofC through a sealed
bid auction; the higher bidder gets the license at his bid price; and ties are
resolved by a random choice. As discussed in Kamien, Oren, and Tauman
(1987), when two licenses are auctioned, a limit on the minimum bid must
be set; and thus, auctioning two licenses is equivalent lo the fee policy
below. Hence throughout this paper the auction policy means auctioning
only one license.
(2) The fee policy: a flat lump-sum license fee a is offered at which
any firm that wishes can purchase a license.
(3) The royalty policy: a flat royalty payment r, 0 c r ~ e, per unit
of production is offered at which any firm can purchase a license.
For each of the three licensing policies, interactions between the paten-
tee and firms are characterized by a multistage noncooperative game,
which is played as follows. When the auction policy is adopted by the
patentee, firms simultaneously and independently determine how much to
bid, and then a licensee is determined. Then, commonly knowing which
firm holds a license, firms engage in a market competition with their
cost functions inherited from the licensing stage: they simultaneously and
independently determine their price levels. We denote this game by G".
ln the case of the fee (or the royalty) policy, the patentee first announces
a fee a(or a royalty payment r), and then firms simultaneously and inde-
pendently decide whether to purchase a license. Then, knowing who holds
a license, firms engage in a market competition. We denote this game by
GF (or GR). It should be noted lhat a licensee's marginal cost is c- e in
the auction and the fee policy, while it is c- e f r in the royalty policy.
A nonlicensee's marginal cost is c, the same as the preinnovation level.
The patentee's payoff is his total rents, and firms' payoffs are their profits
net of license expenses.
In analyzing the games described above, we adopt the subgame perfect
equilibrium (in pure strategies) from Selten (1975). The subgame perfect
equilibrium can be found in a backward manner. We thus first study
Bertrand-Nash equilibria in the product market.
3. EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES IN THE PRODUCT i~IARKET
Bertrand-Nash equilibria of the above-described duopoly market were
already studied in Singh and Vives (1984, pp. 548-549), and thus we only
present the results. In the following, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price,
and the corresponding output level and profit of firm i are denoted by p;,
x;, and Tr;, respectively. Further, the symbot S, 0 ~ S c c, stands for e in
the auction and in the fee policy, and for e- r in the royalty policy.
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The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is given as follows.
(BNI) Bolh firms hold a licensc:
P - 1~, -
(I -B)(n-c-1-S)
~ - 2 - B
~- c- S. .r; - xz -(P; - c f S)I( I - B')b,
~~-~z-(P~-cf S)'-I(I -9'-)b.
(BN2) Neither firm holds a license:
Pi - Pz -
(I -~)(~B c) } c, Xi - .rz - (Pi - c)I(l - 6z)b,
~~ - ~r~ - (n~ - c)'I(I - B')b.
(BN3) Only one firm holds a license: let firm r and firm j be a licensee
and a nonlicensee, respectively.
(i) 0 ~ S c(( I - 0)(2 f B)IO)(n - c):
( I- B)(2 -f- B)(a - c) f(2 - Bz)S } c- S,P; - 4 - 6z
( I- B)(2 f 6)(a - c) - 0 S
P' - 4- Bz
f c,
.r; - (P; - c f S)I(1 - B'-)h,
~; -(P; - c f S)'-I( I - 9z)b,
-r; - (P; - c)I(I - 0')b,
and -rr~ - ( p; - c)'-I( t- Oz)b.
(ii) ((I - B)(2 -~ B)IO)(a - c) ~ S c((2 - B)IB)(rt - c):
P;-(I Be)(n-c)fc', P;-c. .r;-~Bbc .r;-0,
-rr; -(P; - c' f S).r;, and ~r; - 0;
hence a nonlicensee is expelled from Ihe market, but a licensee may not
charge a monopoly price.
(iii) c(2 - 9)le)(a - c) ~ s:
a-cfS}c-s. -c, x.- cfs)Ib, z;-o.P;- 2 P; ,-(P;-
~r; -(p; - c f S)zlb, and a~ - 0;
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Flc.3.1. Anillustrationofbestresponses.
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For better understanding of the equilibria above, firms' best responses
in price space are illustrated in i"ig. 3.1. Note that the equalities p; -
( I- B)a f 9p~ and p; - (Bp~ f( I- B)a f c)l2 come from the nonnegativity
condition on x; in (2. I) and the first order condition in maximizing i's profit
(p; - c)x;, respectively. When 9 is close to I, the ease (i) of (BN3) is
negligible, and thus we consider only the cases (ii) and (iii) in what follows.
We hereafter use W(2, S), W(1, S), and L(I, S) to denote the firms'
equilibrium profits: W(s, S), s- 1, 2, is the equilibrium profil of each
licensee when there are .s licensees, while L(l, S) is the equilibrium profit
of a nonlicensee when his rival holds a license. In case neither firm holds
a license, we denote by L(0) each firm's equilibrium profit. If S- 0, all
of these four values are equal.
Since a licensee may monopolize the market when ((2 - B)IB)
(n - c) ~ S, we call an innovation with e?((2 - 0)IB)(o - c) "drastic":
3~S 31CSL rCS(,OIISC
C (:,- CI. z 7
(I) (I3N2)
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note that as B-~ I, ((2 - U)IB)(a - c) -~ n- c. Refer to Kamien and
Tauman (1986, p. 475).
Concerning the Bertrand-Nash equilibria above, we present the follow-
ing simple observations which will be useful in the following discussion.
They are easily obtained through straighlforward calculation; and thus,
the proofs are omitted.
First, the following properties of equilibrium prices and profits are well
known in Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods:
(1) if firms' marginal costs are identical, the equilibrium price is equal
to Ihe marginal cost, and their profits are zero; and
(2) if marginal costs are different, the firm with a lower cost can drive
out the rival by setting its price at the rival's marginal cost or the monopoly
price.
By letting ~~ I in the equilibria above, this well-known fact follows.
Ohserualiorr 3. I. As e~ I, the following hold.
( I) In the cases (BN 1), (BN2): p, - Pz ~ c- S(resp. c), x, f xZ --~
(n - c f S)Ib (resp. (cr - c)ll~) in (BNI) (resp. in (BN2)), and W(2, S),
L(0) ~ 0.
(2) In the case (BN3): in (ii) p; --~ c, "r; ---~ (a - c)Ib, and W(I, S) -~
S(n - c)Ib; in (iii) p;, x;, and W(1, S) are constant regardless of values of
B; and in both cases L(1, S) - 0. The case (i) disappears when t3--~ 1.
When goods are close substitutes but not homogeneous, the following
is easily obtained from the Bertrand-Nash equilibria above.
Obserucrlion 3.2. If B is close to I, the following hold.
(1) In the cases (BNI), (BN2): p, - pZ J c- S(resp. 1 c) andx, i-
.rZ c(rr - c f S)Ih (resp. c(a - c)Ih) in (BNI) (resp. in (BN2)).
(2) ln the case (BN3) (ii): p; ~ c and .r; ~ (a - c)Ib.
"fhus even if firms' marginal costs are identical, the equilibrium price is
above the marginal cost and thus the firms can gain positive profits; the
equilibrium total output level is lower than lhat in the homogeneous goods
case. Further the firm with a lower marginal cost must set its price below
the rival's cost in order to drive him out. These facts properly reflect the
nonhomogeneily of products.
With respect to the equilibrium profits, the following is observed.
Ohscrunlion 3.3: If B is close to I, lhe following inequalities hold for
each fixed S, 0 c S e c.'
' Thc ineyualities ( I) and (2) still holJ when B~ 0(goocls are substitutes). when t) c 0
IgooJs are complemcros), ineyualities R'(2, S) ~ WII, fi) ~ L(I, Fi) 1 L(0) ~ 0 ancl
14'(2, fi) - L(I, fi) 1 IVI I, ~i) - L(0) hulJ. "i'hus each firm is belteroff when the rival acquires
a license Ithe former), anJ the payofl" to obtaining a license incrcases when the rival holJs
one. A lype of agglomeralion elTect mentioncd in Kalz and shapiro 11986) in a Jifferenl
setting emergcs ( Ihe latler)"
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(I) W(I, S) ~ W(2, S) ~ L(U) ~ L(I, S) ? U;
(2) W(I, S) - L(U) 1 W(2, S) - L(I, S).
I'urther the equality L(I, S) - U holds in (ii), (iii) of (BN3).
The inequality (1) shows that each firm is worse off when the rival
acquires a license; and (2) shows that each firm finds a license less valuable
when its rival holds one. Similar relations appeared in Kamien and Tauman
(1984) in their analysis of licensing in a Cournot oligopoly with homoge-
neous goods. Since W(2, S), L(I, S) and L(U) are all close or equal to 0
(Observation 3.1), we have the stronger inequality W(I, S) - 1,(U) ~
2(W(2, S) - L(I, S)) which will be utilized in analyzing the Cee policy in
the next section.
4. SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIA UNDER THE THREL- POLICIES
4.1. The Auclior, Policy: The Gnme G"
Let li; (i - I, 2) be a bid submitted by firm i and let N" be a payoff to
the patentee. Since W(I, e) 1 L(I, e) for all e~ 0(Observation 3.3), tlie
subgame perfect equilibrium givcs the unique pair of bids b~ - h2 -
W(I, e) - L(I, e); and the corresponding patentee's payoff is N"` -
W(I, e) - L(I, e), where and hereafter the symbol ' is used to denote
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies and the corresponding patentee's
payoff. Hence, firms bid the same amount W(I, e) - L(I, e): only one of
them gets a license by a random choice.
4.2. The Fee Poficy: 1he Gnme Gr
Let a be a fee determined by the patentee. Denote by d; (- B or N) a
decision by firm i, i- I, 2: d; - B(or N) implies lhat firm i buys (or does
not buy) a license. The remark on Observation 3.3(2) shows that the
relation W(I, e) - L(U) ) 2(W(2, e) - L(I, e)) holds; hence, the patentee
gains more profit by selling a license to only one firm at the fee W( I, e) -
L(U) than by selling it to both firms at the fee W(2, s) - L( I, e). Thus the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game GF gives a' - W( I, e) - L(U),
(di , d,`) -(B, N) or (N, B); and the corresponding patentee's payoff is
N F~` - W( I, E) - L(U).
4.3. Thc Roynlry Pvlicy: Tlre Garnc~ GR
Let r be a royalty payment determined by the patentee. As in the fee
policy case, let d; (- B or N) denote a decision by firm i, i- I, 2.
Observation 3.3 shows that the relations W(2, e- r) ~ L(I, t; - r) and
W(I, e- r) 1 L(U) hold as long as r c e. Therefore the pair (B, B) is
the unique equilibrium with respect to firm's decisions under the royalty
payment r with r ~ e. Thus the patentee gains 2rx, where x stands for the
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eyuilibrium output level of each firm when both firms hold a license;
n~tmely, .r -.ri -.r, - (a - c f e- r)I( I t B)(2 - B)b. Recall the case
(BNI) in Section 3. Therefore, noting that the equalion W(2, e- r) -
W( I, e- r) - L( I, s- r) - L(0) holds when r- e, we obtain that lhe
subgame perfect equilibrium of GR gives the following:
(I)Ocecu-c:
r~ - e, (d i, d; ) -(B, B); and the corresponding patentec's payoff is
H~' - 2e(a - c)I(1 ~- B)(2 - 0)b.
(2)cr-c~s:
r' -(u - c f e)l2, ( d ~, d;)- (B, B); and the corresponding patentee's
payoff is HR~ - 2((a - c f e)l2))((a - c f e)l2( I f B)Q - 0)h).
S. THE PAIENTEE'S OPTIMAL POLICY
We now examine the optimal policy of the patentee. Since goods are
close substitutes, we essentially have two cases to be examined: ((1 -
B)(2 f B)IB)(a - c) ~ e c a - c and ((2 - B)IB)(a - c) ~ s. Recall
the three cases of (BN3) in the description of Bertrand-Nash equilibria
(Section 3) and the two cases in the description ofsubgame perfect equilib-
ria in the game GR (Section 4), and note that (I , B)(2 f B)IB-~ 0, (2 -
B)I B-~ I as B--~ 1.
Since L(0) 7 L(I , e) - 0 in these two cases (Observation 3.3), we have
HA' - W( l, e) - L( t, e) 1 W( I, e) - L(0) - HFC`; and thus for the
p:rtentec thc auction is superior to thc fee.
We ncxl compare the auction with the royalty. Pirsl consider Ihe case
of ((I - B)(2 f 0)IB)(o - c) ~ e c o- c; i.e., lhe case of nondraslic
innovations. The patentee's profits in these lwo policies are given by
HAC` -(-(I - B)(a - c)IB f s)((a - c)IBG) ( theauction),
and (5. I )
HR` - 2E ((a - c)I(1 f B)(2 - B)li) (the royalty).
Recall Section 4.1 and the case ( BN3) (ii) in Section 3 for the auction,
and lhe case ( I) in Section 4.3 for the royalty. Thus we obtain through
slraightforward calculation that
HR' ~ H"~` if and only ife ~(1 f B)(2 - B) (a - c).B (2 f B)
Hence the royalty is optimal when e G((1 t B)(2 - B)IB(2 t 8))(a - c).
Note that ( I t B)(2 - B)10(2 f B) --~ 2l3 as B-~ I.
ON LICENSING I'OLICII:S




(I) A nondrastlc Innovallou
(ZI A drnsllc Innovatlon
Fta. 5. L Comparison of the patentee's profits: The royalty vs. Ihe auction.
2C,5
x
Why the royalty is superior to the auction for small e may be explained
in the following manner. Consider first the homogeneous goods case.
Letting B~ I in (5.1), the patentee's profits are given by e(a - c)Ib in
either of the two poticies. See Fig. 5. I( I): the rectangle ABCD depicts this
profit. Thus the two policies are equivalent for the patentee. We here note,
recalling Observation 3.1, that ABCD is equal to e times the equilibrium
total output level of firms with identical marginal costs c; and also equal
to the equilibrium profit of a licensee, a firm with a marginal cost r- e,
when he sels a price at the rival's marginal cost c to drive him out. Il
should be noted further that in the homogeneous goods case the fee policy
gives the patentee the same profit as the royalty since L(0) --~ 0- L(I, e)
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as 0--~ t(Obscrvation 3.1). Therefore the three policies are eyuivalent as
claimed in Kamien and 'fauman (1986).
Now suppose B decrcases from I. In the royalty both firms pay the
royalty payment e, and thus their net marginal costs are c. Obscrvation
3.2 shows that lheir total equilibrium output levcl is less than that in the
homogeneous goods case: the latter is the line segment AB. Thus the
patentee's profit is depicted by, say AEFD. In the auction, Observation
3.2 shows thai the equilibrium price is less than c and thus the patentee's
profil is given by, say GHID. Therefore the difference of these profits is
given by the difference of the areas of AEJG and JH1F. As easily seen,
the former dominates the lalter if e is small. Thus the royalty is superior
to the auction for small innovations.
In the case of ((2 - 8)~B)(a - c) ~ e, i.e., the case of drastic innovalions,
the equilibrium royally payment is r-(~ - c f s)l2, and thus the
patentee's profit is depicted by ABCD in Fig. 5.1(2) when 9--~ I. ln the
auction, the patentee exploits the licensee's monopoly profit, and thus the
patentee's profit is also given by ABCD. !n this case, JHIF dominates
AEJG since e is yuite large. Thus the auction is superior to the royalty.
One may explicitly show this fact through straightforward calculation
using the patentee's profits HA' and HR~` in this case.
In concluding this section, we contrast the results above, in particular
the optimality of the royalty policy in the nondrastic innovation case, with
the outcome in Cournot competition: the auction is superior to the royalty
if goods are homogeneous (Kamien and Tauman, 1986). When goods are
homogeneous and both firms have the same marginal cost c~, the Cournot
equilihrium total oulput level is 2(a - c-)136, and the corresponding price
is c~ f (n - c)l3. Thus, in the royalty policy, the patentee can gain the
profit depicted by AEFD in Fig. 5.2. In Bertrand competition, however,
Ihe patentee's profit in the royalty policy is given by ABCD; recall Fig.
5.1( I). The latter is greater, and essentially this fact induces different
outcomes in Cournot and Bertrand competition. Put differently, the paten-
tee's profit in the royalty policy depends on the equilibrium total output
level, and this amount is significantly greater in Bertrand competilion.
6. CONCLUDING REtifARKS
We have shown that, in licensing a cost-reducing innovation to firms
engaging in Bertrand competition, a patentee may gain more profit by
adopting the royalty policy lhan trom the other two policies, the auction
and the fee. This fact has never appeared in the literature on licensing.
Thus we might claim that our analysis first provides a prediction on the
use of royalties which we often observe empirically.
Our analysis has been limited to patentee's profits in Bertrand competi-








Fta 5.2. Comparison of the patentee's profits in the royally policy: Bertrand vs. Cournot.
manner even if these restrictions are removed. The following is a rough
summary of further outcomes. For details, see Muto (1988).
ln Bertrand competition, if goods are not close substitutes, the royalty
is still optimal for a patentee for small innovations, but for large innova-
tions the fee is oplimal. [n Counot competition, if goods are close substi-
tutes, the fee and the auction are optimal according to whe(her innovalions
are small or large; and if otherwise, the fee is optimal. For consumers and
firms, the fee and the royalty are most favorable, respectively, in both
Bertrand and in Cournot competition.
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